Ahead of this week’s Philanthropy Asia Summit, Thomas Knudsen and I published a commentary in the Business Times on Singapore’s outsized role in the future of the ocean
Debates about ocean protection tend to focus on treaties, national policies, and international agreements. Fisheries quotas are negotiated between governments. Shipping rules are set through global bodies. Marine conservation is often framed as a matter of state responsibility.
Yet many of the decisions that shape the ocean’s condition are made far from diplomatic forums. Ships refuel in ports. Cargo moves through urban terminals. Financial and regulatory systems based in cities influence how maritime industries operate.
Many of the decisions that shape the ocean are, in practice, made in cities.
Few places illustrate this more clearly than Singapore. Its geographic position at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca is often cited as the source of its maritime importance. Geography alone, however, does not explain its role. Over time, Singapore has built a dense network of infrastructure, services, and institutions that make it a central node in global shipping.
Today, it is the world’s largest bunkering hub and one of the busiest transshipment ports. Ships moving between the Indian and Pacific Oceans routinely stop here to refuel, transfer cargo, and change crew. The presence of a major international airport alongside port infrastructure reinforces this position, allowing operators to coordinate logistics in a single location.
This concentration of activity creates a form of influence that extends beyond Singapore’s territorial waters. When access to a port is commercially essential, the standards applied there begin to shape behavior across entire fleets.
This is becoming more apparent as the shipping industry begins to decarbonize. Singapore has positioned itself as an early mover in alternative fuels, with trials in ammonia bunkering and growing infrastructure for methanol. It is also involved in developing green shipping corridors with other major ports. These efforts are partly about climate goals, but they also reflect a commercial imperative: maintaining relevance as the energy basis of shipping shifts.
In this context, the energy transition is tied as much to economic strategy as to environmental concern. Singapore’s limited domestic renewable capacity and reliance on imported energy make long-term energy security a central consideration.
At the same time, the country faces direct exposure to climate risks. Much of Singapore lies close to sea level, and a significant share of its land has been reclaimed. Coastal protection is therefore not an abstract policy question. It is a long-term national priority, with large investments already planned.
This combination of economic dependence on maritime activity and physical exposure to ocean change creates an unusual alignment. The ocean is not simply a domain of trade or conservation. It is part of the infrastructure that underpins Singapore’s stability.
Singapore’s influence also extends beyond its own coastline. As a financial and logistical hub for Southeast Asia, it sits at the center of regional supply chains that include fisheries, aquaculture, and coastal development. Standards applied in shipping, finance, and trade can shape practices in neighboring countries, even if indirectly.
Finance is one pathway. Singapore-based institutions have supported investments in areas such as mangrove restoration and the development of the blue economy across the region. These efforts reflect a growing recognition that coastal ecosystems provide economic value as natural infrastructure, helping to reduce risk while supporting livelihoods.
There are also signs of this convergence within Singapore itself. The Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation, based in the city, brings together industry and finance to support new technologies and transition pathways. Its recent work on fuel efficiency and alternative propulsion illustrates how technical, financial, and regulatory elements can align within a single hub.
A broader pattern emerges. Ports, fuel infrastructure, financial systems, and data networks do not govern the open ocean directly. They shape how it is used.
Singapore is not alone in this. Other cities also influence maritime activity through port rules and market demand. What distinguishes Singapore is the degree to which these functions are concentrated in one place.
That concentration creates an opportunity, but also a constraint. Singapore has traditionally been cautious about positioning itself as a leader on environmental issues in the region. Its role has often been to facilitate rather than to direct, reflecting both political sensitivities and a preference for pragmatic cooperation.
That approach may prove effective in ocean governance. Changes in shipping practices, fuel systems, and supply chains often depend less on declarations than on infrastructure and incentives. They require coordination across industries and borders, but they can begin with operational decisions in key locations.
Singapore’s influence is likely to remain indirect. It is less about controlling the seas than shaping the systems that interact with them.
The future of the oceans will still depend on national governments and international agreements. But as those processes move forward, the role of cities—especially those that sit at the center of global trade—may become more visible. Singapore is unusual in that it is both a city and a state, combining municipal and national levers in one place.
Singapore already occupies that position. The question is how it chooses to use it.
